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Metaphors We Act By: Kinesthetics, Cognitive Psychology, and 
Historical Structures 
Bruce A. McConachie 
"The [Actor's] Studio is close to the roots of our time." 
William Inge 
I 
At the climax of the "Poker Night" scene in A Streetcar Named Desire, 
Marlon Brando howeled a plea that echoed and amplified the prototypical 
Misunderstood Male in the culture of post-war America. The explosion of 
emotion behind his "STELLLAHHHHH!" seemed to comunicate immediately and 
viscerally to theatregoers (and later to moviegoers), who sought similar 
experiences in the frustrated-sensitive-loner characterizations of James Dean, Paul 
Newman, and others from the late 1940s through the early '60s. But how exactly 
did audiences make sense of Brando's moment on stage? How does the actor's 
use of his or her body help to shape the perceptions and understandings produced 
by spectators? And what do these kinesthetically generated meanings have to do 
with the construction and reproduction of culture? How, in other words, are 
kinesthetics, psychology, and historical structures linked together? 
At stake in the theoretical controversies surrounding this question is the 
potential agency of the body in history. The dominant tendency of western 
science since the Enlightenment has been to understand the body as one among 
many physical objects in the universe, thus reducing it to a passive recipient of 
external and internal forces and drives. As sociologist Paul Connerton remarks, 
the "linguistic turn" of recent scholarship has reinforced this tendency: "When the 
defining feature of the human species was seen as language, the body was 
'readable' as a text or code, but the body is regarded as the arbitrary bearer of 
meanings; bodily practices are acknowledged, but in an etherealized form" (101). 
In conventional versions of semiotic and Foucauldian analysis, for example, the 
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body is a kind of tabula rasa upon which culture inscribes meaning. But is 
"inscription" an appropriate metaphor for understanding bodies in history? 
The problematics of kinesthetics and history are particularly crucial for the 
cogency and practice of new historicism. This approach to historical explanation 
is grounded on Nietszche's understanding that our classificatory systems of 
knowledge antedate our corporeal existence; consequently, historical agency 
resides finally in discourse, not bodies. I believe that there is much in new 
historicism, specifically Stephen Greenblatt's practice of it, that can lead to 
productive ways of thinking about and writing the history of performance. 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, however, has aptly criticized new historicism for its 
failure to account for and include the dynamics of historical structures, 
specifically issues of agency and cultural hegemony. Because they emphasize 
textual systems over historical structures, Greenblatt and his new historicist 
colleagues have no theoretical guidelines to help them determine which of the 
metaphorical systems they are investigating were historically super- or sub-
ordinate in their societies. Fox-Genovese adds that "the very notion of textuality 
in the large sense embodies the insistence on system, interconnection, and 
seamlessness, and therefore leads inescapably to what [Fredric] Jameson calls 
totalization. That recognition is compelling, but it rests upon a denial of 
boundaries" (218).1 
To avoid the problem of totalization, Fox-Genovese calls for historians to 
write structural history: 
By structural, I mean that history must disclose and reconstruct the 
conditions of consciousness and action, with conditions understood as 
systems of social relations, including relations between women and 
men, between rich and poor, between the powerful and the powerless; 
among those of different faiths, different races, and different classes. 
I further mean that at any given moment, systems of relations operate 
in relation to a dominant tendency—for example, what Marxists call 
a mode of production—that endows them with structure. Both in the 
past and in the interpretation of the past, history follows a pattern or 
structure, according to which some systems of relations and some 
events possess greater significance than others (217-18). 
I share Fox-Genovese's desire to fold systems of discourse into historical 
structures and believe that her historiographical program may be enhanced by an 
epistemology which recognizes the embodiedness of human understanding. Such 
an approach is particularly suited to the history of performance because it 
foregrounds the physical actions of the performer. 
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The title of my essay borrows deliberately from a 1980 study, Metaphors 
We Live By, by "experiential realists" George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Lakoff 
and Johnson implicitly challenge historiographical approaches that privilege 
language and systems over bodies and structures as the stuff of history. My chief 
historical example in linking their insights to the dynamics of performative 
meaning is the relationship established between actors trained in The Method and 
audiences eager to validate their experience of post-war culture in the theatre. 
In brief, Strasberg educated actors to understand and use their bodies as 
"containers," an image schemata that provided a kinesthetic model for Americans 
in the 1950s.2 Lakoff and Johnsons' experiential realism invites theatre historians 
to trace the domination of specific modes of embodiment as a part of the 
production and maintenance of theatrical formations and the historical cultures in 
which they flourished. 
n 
Issues of embodiment, meaning, and cultural production have long been 
points of controversy between semioticians and phenomenologists writing about 
the theatre. Any discussion that hopes to advance a new approach to historical 
explanation involving meaning-making by audiences must begin by locating it in 
the context of these ongoing debates. 
Semioticians and phenomenologists disagree about the nature of the 
impression actors make on the perceptions of the audience. Most semioticians, 
following the work of Kier Elam and Patrice Pavis, understand theatrical 
communication as the confluence of at least two sign systems, referential and 
performant. Referential signs, which abound in spoken dialogue, focus the 
spectators on the fictitious world of the play. Performant signs, however, pull the 
audience out of their involvement in the dramatic story and into a delight (or 
disappointment) with the presence and skill of the actors on the stage. While the 
referential and performant sign systems of a production may be closely aligned, 
spectators cannot use both systems simultaneously to make sense of its stage 
images. Audience members may and usually do combine these separate signs to 
understand their experience, but theatrical communication provides no overarching 
semiotic system that facilitates their attempt at synthesis. From a semiotic point 
of view, spectators understood Brando's "STELLA!" as both an expression of the 
actor's virtuosity and as an important development in the unfolding of Streetcar's 
plot. 
The result of these different decoding processes is "genuine informational 
polyphony," as Roland Barthes noted in 1964 (258), the elaboration on stage of 
a carnaval of signs from distinct systems that invites spectators to interpret what 
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they see and hear in a variety of ways. The disjunctive between Brando's 
domination of crucial scenes on stage and the role of Stanley Kowalski in the plot 
troubled the critic Harold Clurman, for example, because it pulled the meanings 
of the production in two different directions. "Brando's innate quality and 
something unresolved in the director's concept make the scene moving in a way 
that is thematically disruptive," wrote Clurman. "It is not integrated with that 
attribute of the play which requires that Kowalski at all times be somewhat vile" 
(Kazan 351). Most semioticians agree, however, that spectators usually integrate 
(or overlook) such disparities to make coherent sense of their theatrical 
experience.3 
In general, phenomenologists object that semioticians murder spectator 
perception to dissect it Citing phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, Bert States 
implicitly rejects the referential-performant distinction: "It is impossible . . . to 
decompose a perception, to make it into a collection of sensations, because in it 
the whole is prior to the parts" (7). For States, spectators see and hear the actor 
simultaneously as both character and performer; the experience is a gestalt. An 
actor's moment on stage, says States, is "a single aural-visual event. It would not 
be a question of two languages coming together into a unity but of a single 
motive pervading the actor's body and producing speech and movement" (138). 
Reading States' into an interpretation of Brando's signature moment in Streetcar, 
the audience would have focused on the star's body as a channel for the 
expression of both the actor's virtuosity and the character's emotions in Williams' 
play. 
States builds his insights on Bruce Wilshire's elucidation of the embodied 
nature of the actor-audience relationship in his Role Playing and Identity: The 
Limits of Theatre as Metaphor. We watch actors, believes Wilshire, "to give 
release to our primal mimetic absorptions in types of doing and being" (23). At 
their most basic level, these absorptions are socially kinesthetic: "One becomes 
aware of what one's body already is: something modelled on others mimetically" 
(25). Theatrical mimesis gives spectators back to themselves, helping them to 
complete and extend their kinesthetic self understanding. "The bodily and 
communal fictive variation that is theatre supplies me with the communally 
constituted missing parts of my own experiencing body" (26), says Wilshire. He 
might have noted that Brando's Stanley made possible the combination of a 
vulgar aggressiveness on the outside and a vulnerable innocence on the inside for 
his American spectators. Thus playgoing, for Wilshire, serves a vital social-
psychological function: by identifying with actors, spectators become aware of the 
social construction of their own bodies, experience themselves as an "other," and 
consequently achieve significant individuation. As occurs in watching sports 
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events but with greater social-historical range and psychological depth, 
theatregoing socializes and individuates through the body. 
Paul Connerton extends Wilshire's kinesthetic phenomenology into the 
realms of social memory and historical structures. Demonstrating that people's 
experience of the present depends upon their knowledge of the past, Connerton 
shows that images of the past are best conveyed and maintained through 
"incorporating" practices wherein cultural messages ranging from postural 
behavior to religious obedience are conveyed through physical actions. These 
performances, says Connerton, constitute a "mnemonics of the body" (74), 
generally insuring the preservation of traditional structures of super- and sub-
ordination. Because performing habits of incorporation (eg., shaking hands with 
another person) requires kinesthetic memory but no abstract mental categories, 
Connerton objects to interpreting habits in terms of a linguistic system. The 
meaning of any incorporating practice, he states, "cannot be reduced to a sign 
which exists on a separate 'level' outside the immediate sphere of the body's 
acts" (95).4 In the theatre, Connerton's "mnemonics of the body" works in the 
same ways to maintain kinesthetic systems and, through them, historical 
structures. 
Unfortunately, neither Wilshire's nor Connerton's study explains the 
cognitive processes underlying the kinesthetics of theatrical communication. To 
comprehend the psychology of cognition during playwatching, for example, 
Wilshire must extrapolate from a 1950 work by Paul Schilder, The Image and 
Appearance of the Human Body, which, Wilshire admits, confuses 
phenomenological with behavioristic approaches. But his main difficulty is 
explaining how spectators experienced embodied images and sounds emanating 
from actors on the stage as a gestalt. Audiences in the presence of Brando-
Stanley shouting "Stella!" somehow connected this impression with more basic 
categories of perception, thought, action, and speech that they brought with them 
to the theatre. But what were these more basic categories of cognition, 
facilitating, indeed determining, a coherent and unified process of perception and 
understanding? Like States after him, Wilshire provides persuasive examples and 
logical explanations for his assertion that audience cognition is actually a gestalt, 
but neither can point to recent experiments in cognitive psychology which might 
substantiate their claim. Without such evidence concerning the basic categories 
and mechanisms of cognition, their explanations for the socially constitutive 
function of theatregoing lack substantial support. Lakoff and Johnsons' 
experiential realism provides a firm foundation, plus several strong stories, to 
undergird their phenomenological position. 
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In their recent review essay of Lakoffs Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things and Johnson's The Body in the Mind, Tracy Henley and Michael Johnson 
conclude that both books, viewed together, "may be among the most significant 
contributions in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics to have appeared in 
years" (250). As the reviewers note, the works nicely complement each other, 
Lakoffs focused on the experimental basis for their assertions and Johnson's 
concerned with the epistemological implications of their position. Henley and 
Johnson link both books to traditions in philosophy and psychology that include 
Wittgenstein's interest in primitive bodily experience, Vygotsky's marriage of 
cognition and social interaction, Piaget's emphasis on mental schemata in human 
development, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological psychology, and more recently, 
John Searle's concept of "background" in speech acts. At the same time, the 
reviewers praise Lakoff and Johnson's unique and substantial contributions in 
helping to resolve the crisis among current theories of cognition, meaning, and 
rationality. 
In the early chapters of Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Lakoff 
summarizes the experimental basis for his later assertions. How human beings 
categorize their perceptions to create meaning has been the fundamental question 
animating this research. In experiments that seem to validate aspects of Peter 
Brooks's intercultural theatre productions, for example, Paul Ekman and others 
demonstrated the existence of basic categories of human emotions uniformly 
expressed across cultures in the muscles of the face and torso. Synthesizing 
much of the work that had gone before her, Eleanor Rosch was the first to 
understand categorization itself as the primary issue in the psychology of 
cognition. Her experiments challenged the classical notion that all members of 
a category of thought would have psychologically equal status within that 
category. People asked to judge chickens, robins, and ostriches, for example, as 
members of the category of "bird" should, under classical theory, find them all 
equally representative. Instead, subjects chose "prototypical" members of each 
category (robins, in the above example), exposing a troubling gap between the 
classical notion of categorization and the conclusions of cognitive science. 
Lakoffs own experiments confirm Rosch's findings about prototypes and basic 
level categories, widening the gap between classical objectivism and experiential 
realism into a canyon.5 
In both of their 1987 books, Lakoff and Johnson mount a substantial attack 
on classical objectivism. In brief, objectivism assumes that there exists a 
transcendent, correct, "God's-Eye" view of reality, a perspective that must provide 
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the basis for all human knowledge. For objectivists, meaning is abstract, deriving 
from rational operations connecting mental representations to each other or to 
phenomena in a reality outside of the mind Correct reasoning joins concepts 
together to form propositions of various kinds through a limited number of logical 
connectives. The concepts "Brando" and "stage," for example, may form the 
proposition "Brando is on the stage," which may then be extended logically to "if 
Brando is on stage, then he is not in the audience." Hence, objectivist reasoning 
is propositional. It is also disembodied. Drawing on the Cartesian and Kantian 
traditions of philosophy, objectivism assumes a split in human experience 
between the mind and the body which segregates the physical processes of 
sensation and perception from the mental operations involved in making meaning. 
"Brando is on the stage," objectivists might assert, not because our brains have 
evolved to construct meaning in certain ways, but because any mind in the 
universe could deduce this conclusion, regardless of its physical abilities to sense 
and explain. Lakoff and Johnson find objectivism alive and well in computer 
models of the brain, Chomskyan linguistics, and many other approaches to 
cognitive psychology. 
Countering objectivism with experiential realism, Johnson states that "any 
adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to 
embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp the 
world" (xiii). For Lakoff and Johnson, these structures are the basic-level 
categories discerned by Rosch and others, plus "image schemata." They define 
a schemata as "a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and 
motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience" (Johnson, 
xiv). The source-path-goal schema, for instance, which humans know 
kinesthetically at an early age by moving from a starting point to an end point, 
structures certain events in our experience as a narrative with a beginning, 
middle, and end. 
Unlike the conceptual building blocks of objectivism, image schemata are 
nonpropositional and figurative. The source-path-goal schema, for example, is 
not an abstract, subject-predicate structure (such as "Brando is on the stage") that 
specifies certain conditions of truth that can be satisfied by looking at reality (eg., 
to see if Brando really is on the stage). Rather, the image schema exists as an 
ongoing mechanism in our understanding which comes between perception and 
conception. Propositional knowledge can still be accommodated within 
experiential realism, however, as kinds of statements which fit within schematic 
understanding; they are simply no longer the foundations of epistemology. 
Indeed, 'linguistic meaning' itself, says Johnson, "is only an instance or 
specification of meaningfulness in general"(176). Both authors also understand 
schematas as figurative; that is, relations among their parts may be charted by 
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simple line drawings. As a figure, the source-path-goal schema is an arrow 
drawn from point A and ending at point B. Both the figurative and 
nonpropositional characteristics of image schemata place them beyond the pale 
of objectivist theory. 
From Lakoff and Johnsons' point of view, the science of semiotics also 
suffers from objectivism. Semiotic statements of truth are propositional and 
abstract; they admit of no psychological structures intervening between the 
perceived signifier and the conceived signified. Once the spectator understands 
the abstract code connecting the material signifier on stage to the concept to 
which it refers, she or he can combine them with other signs to make sense of 
the play. This process rests on establishing an abstract, disembodied relationship 
between signs and objective, extra-mental reality, the hallmark of classical 
objectivism. Although most semioticians would disavow the possibility of 
achieving a "God's-Eye" view of reality, semiotics, lacking any notion of basic 
level categories or image schematas, backs into an objectivist view of meaning 
and reasoning. 
For Lakoff and Johnson, preconceptual image schematas structure a variety 
of fundamental actions, perceptions, and events. They have noted and discussed 
several dozen of these schemata, including "link," "balance," "force," and 
"container." "Links" structure our experience of causal connection. "Balancing" 
gives coherence to visual perception, among other things. The "force" schema 
helps us to understand how we act on our environment or are acted upon by it. 
Our experience of our bodies as three-dimensional containers, with an inside and 
an outside, structures much of our orientation in space. Johnson's illustration of 
this in-out schema points up its ubiquity in our everyday lives: 
Consider, for example, only a few of the many in-out orientations that might 
occur in the first few minutes of an ordinary day. You wake out of a deep 
sleep and peer out from beneath the covers into you room. You gradually 
emerge out of your stupor, pull yourself out from under the covers, climb 
into your robe, stretch out your limbs, and walk in a daze out of the 
bedroom and into the bathroom (30). 
In Lakoff's and Johnson's understanding, the above experiences would be 
impossible without a container schemata to organize and connect them. Even the 
kind of formal, propositional reasoning necessary in mathematics could not occur, 
notes Lakoff, without image schemata to facilitate it (222-27). As Johnson 
insists, schemata are the "primary means by which we construct or constitute 
order and are not mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured" (30). 
In their internal structures, image schemata are coherent and unified wholes; 
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we experience them as gestalts. Experiments by Rosch and others validating 
prototype theory, notes Lakoff, have found that "certain clusters of conditions are 
more basic to human experience than other clusters and also more basic than 
individual conditions in the cluster" (489). Consequendy, these schematas are 
"experiential gestalts," the wholes of which are psychologically simpler than their 
parts (Lakoff 489). The gestalt nature of image schémas derives from their origin 
in common physical action: humans learn at an early age, for instance, that they 
can balance their bodies and that there is a difference between their insides and 
the rest of the world. Primal balancing and containing are experienced 
kinesthetically as gestalts and are thereafter available as schematas of balance and 
containment to structure similar experiences in the same way. Johnson concedes 
that "experiential basicness is a relative matter. Yet," he adds, "because our 
bodies are very much alike with respect to their physiological nature, we would 
expect to find commonly shared (if not universal) gestalt structures for many of 
our physical interactions with our environment" (62). 
The gestalt nature of image schemata tends to validate the phenomenological 
point of view of Bert States, Paul Connerton, and Bruce Wilshire regarding the 
experience of an audience at the theatre. Spectators watching Brando shout 
"Stella!" would experience a gestalt, according to the psychology of Lakoff and 
Johnson, because an image schemata would structure their comprehension of the 
event. In this particular case, the schemata of containment probably interceded 
between most spectators' perception and their understanding, since the explosive 
force of Brando's plea came out of a body writhing in anguish and frustration. 
Of course the validity of this line of reasoning depends on historical evidence that 
spectators in the late '40s were likely to understand actors' bodies as containers 
of emotions. 
Lakoff and Johnson's explanation of metaphorical systems as linked to the 
construction and reproduction of culture provides a way into this line of 
reasoning. As they assert, the process of cognition uses image schematas directly 
or extends them through metonomy and metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson discard 
the objectivist notion that metaphors are simply figures of speech reducible to 
literal propositions. Objectivists would reduce the metaphor "lust is hunger," for 
instance, to a statement that the concept of lust and the concept of hunger are 
alike in certain respects. Instead, Lakoff and Johnson insist that metaphors are 
irreducible and "play a constitutive role in the structuring of our experience" 
(Johnson 73). Metaphors do this by crossing the boundaries of basic 
categories—in the above example, by blurring literal distinctions between sexual 
desire and digestive appetite. Using an image schemata as a basis, metaphors 
map one concept onto another from a different category. Metaphorical 
expressions such as "You make my blood boil" and "She was seething with rage" 
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rely on the container schemata to understand the body as a cauldron of the 
emotions and then translate the concept of heat onto the concept of anger (Lakoff 
380-415). Although metaphors draw fundamentally on physical experience 
through image schemata, they cross conceptual boundaries to blend kinesthetic 
knowledge with cultural, linguistic, and historical understanding. 
In this way metaphors provide much of the basis for cultural tension and 
cohesion among social groups. The structure of metaphorical systems dominant 
in any group, built up through frequently deployed image schemata, constrain 
their construction of reality. These systems, states Johnson, "establish a range of 
possible patterns of understanding and reasoning. They are like channels in 
which something can move with a certain limited, relative freedom. Some 
movements [i.e., some inferential meanings] are not possible at all. They are 
ruled out by the image schemata and metaphors" (137). In effect, image 
schemata and their metaphors help to constitute what Fox-Genovese calls "the 
conditions of consciousness and action" (217) among different social groups in 
history. 
Beyond the reproduction of conventional meanings within social groups, 
metaphors can create new understandings and, consequently, new realities. In 
Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson note that "much of cultural change 
arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old 
ones. For example, the Westernization of cultures throughout the world is partly 
a matter of introducing the 'time is money' metaphor into those cultures" (145). 
Metaphorical systems and their parent schemata both constrain and change 
historical cultures. 
IV 
The above discussion opens the way for investigating a particular 
conjunction of actors and audiences in the same historical culture. While no 
analysis can ever prove that most audience members were experiencing certain 
feelings and ideas when they enjoyed a group of actors, historical reconstruction, 
in tandem with theoretical understanding, can point to the likelihood of such 
experiences. How actors and audience members made meaning through their 
bodies—in particular, how they relied on certain metaphors and image schemata 
to construct their understandings—will be a key question in these investigations. 
While the historian might begin with either actors or audiences, an initial focus 
on the discourse and practice of acting in a particular period makes sense because 
of the specificity of available information. 
It may seem that the container schemata is such a "natural" way of 
comprehending our physicality that all other constructions would be secondary 
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or even superfluous. Historically, however, cultures have constructed the human 
body through a variety of primary metaphors and schemata. In the eighteenth 
century, the up-down schema, deriving from thousands of daily activities and 
perceptions relating to the experience of vertically, typically structured 
physicality as hierarchy. Numerous plays and such acting texts as James Burgh's 
The Art of Speaking encouraged performers on the stage and off to achieve self-
mastery by subordinating low, selfish passions to the dictates of high, enlightened 
reason (Roach 99-118). Early in the twentieth century, Meyerhold and the 
Futurists used the force schemata and its metaphorical extension, the machine, to 
constitute the bodily movements of workers and actors. Brecht relied on the 
process schemata, encouraging his actors to use their bodies to facilitate a 
systematic series of actions directed toward eventual understanding and action 
from the audience. 
The Method's construction of the bodies of actors and spectators as 
containers is just as culturally embedded as the above schematas and metaphors. 
This is not to say, of course, that these historical orientations to the body 
excluded other metaphors and schémas from their discourse. Acting texts from 
Burgh to Strasberg used metaphors from a wide range of schematas to constitute 
and explain emotion, gesture, and the actor-audience relationship. But it is to 
claim that certain schemata have gained dominance in culturally constructed 
images of the body in specific cultures and historical periods. 
Because every schemata has a distinctive internal logic, certain consequences 
follow from the relations among its parts. Containment, for example, involves 
necessary relations among an inside, an outside, and a boundary between them. 
Johnson summarizes five entailments that derive from this figuration: 
(i) The experience of containment typically involves protection from, 
or resistance to, external forces. When eyeglasses are in a case, they 
are protected against forceful impacts, (ii) Containment also limits and 
restricts forces within the container. When I am in a room or in a 
jacket, I am restrained in my forceful movements, (iii) Because of this 
restraint of forces, the contained object gets a relative fixity of 
location. For example, the fish gets located in the fishbowl. The cup 
is held in the hand, (iv) This relative fixing of location within the 
container means that the contained object becomes either accessible or 
inaccessible to the view of some observer. It is either held so that it 
can be observed or else the container itself blocks or hides the object 
from view, (v) Finally, we experience transitivity of containment. If 
B is in A, then whatever is in B is also in A. If I am in my bed and 
my bed is in my room, then I am also in my room (22). 
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These five entailments provide a convenient framework for organizing an 
understanding of Method acting within the audience's experience of post-war 
culture from the point of view of experiential cognitive psychology. 
To take the third entailment first, Lee Strasberg's Method fixed the location 
and reality of the true self for his actors. "An actor must deal with deep, firm 
things inside himself," he said (quoted in Vineberg 104). Vivica Lindfors 
claimed that Strasberg taught her to use her "inner life as a tool. He helped me 
to organize my chaos" (Adams 212). As Jack Garfein stated in another container 
metaphor, Strasberg made every actor at the Studio feel he had "great inner 
treasures" (Hirsch 167). Many of Strasberg's most notable exercises, including 
personalization and affective memory, assumed the reality of a inner self, less 
conscious but more genuine than the mask worn on the outside for public 
purposes. In short, for Strasberg, the "inner emotional experience" (Strasberg 19) 
of every actor was the core of her or his being. Actors who learned how to open 
this treasure chest and utilize those "deep, firm things inside" could perform with 
authenticity and sincerity. Actors who did not draw on their true selves to create 
their roles ran the risk of seeming to lack genuineness and honesty in front of 
their audiences. 
For Strasberg, this was a matter of ethics as well as technique. A letter 
writer to the New York Times "Drama Mailbag" complained in 1956 that "Lee 
Strasberg and his fellows are always seeking justification for their histrionic 
theories in the words 'honest' and 'sincere,' adjectives that apply to ethical 
conduct and not necessarily to the field of esthetics as well" (Strasberg Clipping 
File, NYPL). In a revealing anecdote, Carroll Baker recalled that when she and 
other women attended classes at the Studio, they did not wear makeup. "I mean, 
we were serious," said Baker. "All that was important was our studying" (Adams 
218). If truth and authenticity are on the inside, it would be dishonest to paint 
the outside. 
In Strasberg's conception of insides and outsides in the performance event, 
the inner self of the actor nested inside the character she or he were playing 
which, in turn, rested within the given circumstances of the dramatic action, while 
the entire performance on stage occurred within the public arena of a theatre. 
Many apparent contradictions in Strasberg's language disappear when the 
transitivity of his containers are recognized. Thus Strasberg can tell Keir Dullea 
"to learn to live on stage simply and believably, within the logic of your 
character" in one breath and then urge him "to provide a basis for yourself, of 
how you would be inside that character" in the next (Hirsch 133). The inner self 
is always the smallest of these Chinese boxes, but it rests within larger containers 
to which actors must adjust. When these containers within containers are 
properly aligned, the walls between them tend to disappear for audiences. Thus 
Spring 1993 37 
Arthur Penn could say that Method acting can give spectators "a sense of a 
character's inner life, all radiating from the actor's genuinely personal core" 
(Hirsch 223). In Strasberg's memory, the containers surrounding Eleanora Duse 
became transparent as she searchingly revealed the "innermost parts of herself' 
(Hirsch 146) to American spectators in the 1920s. Her performance glowed from 
within. 
By placing the actor's inner self at the core of the performance event, 
however, Strasberg valorized the presumed uniqueness of the performer over the 
larger containers encapsulating it, including the character as constituted by the 
text. In effect, Strasberg arranged his Chinese boxes in hierarchical order, 
ranking the smallest and innermost at the top. Norman Mailer noted in wry 
amusement "how disagreeable" and "even brutal" it was for the Method actor 
"when his role is not adequate to him, when he cannot act with some subtle 
variations of his personal style" (Hirsch 112). The largest and outermost of the 
performance containers, the play as public event, was also the lowest in 
importance for Strasberg. When actors tried to turn the workshop environment 
of his Studio toward the performance conditions of a public theatre, he typically 
reacted with patriarchal vengeance. "How dare you use this place to try to 
impress us!" he commanded Martin Balsam in the early 1950s (Adams 207). 
Theodore Hoffman later complained with some justification that many Method 
actors "really weren't the least bit interested in communicating anything to the 
audience" (Vineberg 103). 
Strasberg drew his understanding of the relation between character and given 
circumstances, two of his Chinese boxes, from Stanislavski. Natalie Crohn 
Schmidtt concludes that the Russian actor and theorist 
defined the self in opposition to the world, relating the idea of 
individuality (and consequently psychology as a whole) to this 
separateness of the self from the rest of the world and from other 
persons. The context in which the self operates he called the given 
circumstances. In Stanislavski's view, the human environment and 
human identity do not interact, and certainly they are not 
interpenetrating; instead, the self is a largely autonomous constant, 
identifiably the same entity from beginning to end. (97) 
While Stanislavski emphasized the transitivity relating characters and their given 
circumstances in the world of the play, Strasberg focused on the containers of self 
and character. He strove to elide the boundaries separating them through 
personalization and affective memory exercises, techniques which Stanislavski 
repudiated. Significantly, Strasberg totally rejected the interpénétration that 
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occurs among self and character in the acting ideas of Viola Spolin. "Students 
must see that theatre comes from real things, not from games or make believe," 
he told Dramatics magazine in 1977 (12). Arguably, Strasberg altered 
Stanislavski's emphasis on the world of the play to substitute the world of the 
self. 
The "real things" of an actor's inner reality, however, are often hidden from 
normal view. This accords with the fourth entailment of the containment 
schemata mentioned above by Johnson. One Studio actor spoke of Strasberg's 
acumen at providing him with techniques "to dig up [his] guts" (Hirsch 212), as 
though the inner self required extensive mining operations to reveal its treasures. 
More often, admirers of Strasberg used medical metaphors to describe his ability 
to penetrate the boundary between the outer and inner self without harming the 
actor-patient. Robert Hethmon described Strasberg as a man with "the objectivity 
of a doctor who stands outside the body he is treating" (Vineberg 104). And 
Cindy Adams believed that Strasberg "x-rays a man's soul" (208). For many 
observers of the Method, of course, Strasberg-the-doctor became, more 
specifically, Strasberg-the-psychiatrist, society's sanctioned surgeon of the psyche 
in the 1950s. 
In a different guise (because the metaphors drew on a different entailment 
of containment), Strasberg also made frequent house calls as an engineer of the 
emotions. Strasberg "opened the floodgates for me," confessed Eva Marie Saint 
(Hirsch 168). Because containment limits and constricts the forces within its 
boundaries, it was linguistically appropriate for Strasberg to understand his work 
as freeing emotions that were "blocked," "trapped," or otherwise "frustrated." 
Historian of the Method Foster Hirsch notes Strasberg's use of the "private 
moment" exercise to "rip through the actor's defenses, release tensions that have 
built up over the years, and help to free the actor physically and vocally" (Hirsch 
138). Strasberg explained his "singing-the-words" exercise as a technique for 
"control of energy. It starts as a trap; no involuntary impulse can come out. If 
we stand still and vibrate the voice, things build up inside, you get frustrated, 
then thought allows impulse to express itself (Hirsch 143). When the body is 
understood as a container of feelings, the idea that these emotions may become 
disruptive and burst out is a consequent entailment. 
Of course random erruptions were never Strasberg's goal. In a revealing 
container metaphor, Strasberg spoke to his students of the actor's unconscious as 
though it were a "caged bird." "How can we make the bird do what we want? 
That's our aim here. We cage it, lock it up, train it" (Hirsch 131). Affective 
memory exercises were one way to train the bird to sing on key and at the right 
time. Having participated in many of these exercises, one actor noted that she 
had built up "an emotional filing cabinet" that she had learned "how to draw on 
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quickly" (Hirsch 211). As master engineer, Strasberg believed he was training 
his actors not only how to stoke their emotional fires, but also how to channel 
their head of steam to drive themselves at full throttle down the tracks of their 
character's actions. 
But adversaries always got in the way. The container schemata and its 
metaphors entails the need to protect those inside the container from forces on the 
outside. For actors, the biggest external threat to their success envisioned by 
Strasberg was the audience. Strasberg feared what spectators—those, he said, 
"beyond the black and terrible hole of the proscenium arch" (Strasberg 
50)—could do to an actor's concentration and hence to his art. He cited 
Stanislavski's understanding of the actor's need to be "private in public" and 
developed specific exercises to ward off stage fright. In this regard, it is probably 
not accidental that many of the most successful performances of Method actors 
occurred on film. In Method Actors: Three Generations of an American Acting 
Style, Steve Vineberg noted that Kazan, Strasberg, and other teachers produced 
actors "as comfortable in front of the camera as they were on stage" (99). More 
comfortable really, since actors could entirely shut out what they had been trained 
to believe was their major antagonist, the audience. 
Since audiences could confer public acclaim as well as induce stage fright, 
a related external threat to acting was professional success. In his autobiography 
A Dream of Passion, Strasberg reproduced a drawing done by Boleslavsky at the 
Laboratory Theatre in the 1920s which represented an allegorical house through 
which Everyactor must journey to perfect his art (81). On top of the house, two 
chimneys labelled "praise" and "glory" belch smoke, signifying the mystification 
that public acclaim can cause when an actor is blinded by them. Despite his 
ambiguous behavior toward such stars as Brando and Monroe, Strasberg warned 
against success throughout his teaching career. "People at the top start to go; the 
most talented are the most vulnerable. When you become successful, at that 
moment, it dries up, deserts, becomes arid" (Hirsch 148). Here is the sunlight of 
success scorching vulnerable talent, as though burnt in an oven. 
Strasberg also identified several external threats to his approach to teaching 
acting. Preeminent among them was what he termed the "British school." "The 
English style is outdated," Strasberg pontificated. "It is acting: it is not humanity 
or reality" (Hirsch 219). For him, English acting was external, cultivated, formal, 
and reserved—the antithesis of American authenticity, emotion, and energy. 
Writing his autobiography in the 1970s during the American theatre's excitement 
over the work of Grotowski, Strasberg saw his Method as beseiged and rushed 
to its defense. Grotowski's approach, like Meyerhold's and other "external" 
schools, "negates the presence of an emotional experience," wrote Strasberg, by 
emphasizing physical action as fundamental (184). Strasberg also found minor 
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enemies in former colleagues, like Sandford Meisner and Stella Adler, who had 
begun in what he considered the Stanislavski fold, but had wandered away from 
the container of the flock. Strasberg's seige mentality communicated itself to the 
actors. Jack Garfein noted "the 'inner circle' psychology" of Studio sessions, "the 
defensiveness, the sense that we were all initiates in a private club" (Hirsch 167). 
An acting culture based so fundamentally on containment entails such defensive-
aggressive attitudes and behavior. 
Clearly, the entailments of containment structured the major elements of The 
Method for Strasberg and his advocates. But did audiences also experience 
Method acting as somehow "contained?" When they watched Brando-Stanley 
shout "Stella," did these same entailments prompt them to think that the actor-
character's body could no longer contain his emotions? To begin to answer this 
question requires that the Method's discourse about acting be placed in the 
context of post-war culture and society. 
V 
Audiences experience acting theory indirectly. Brando played Stanley 
Kowalski in A Streetcar Named Desire; he did not play a Method Actor. To 
locate Brando-Kowalski in a dramatic narrative is to acknowledge that the source-
path-goal schema also played a significant role in shaping the audience's 
perception of Brando's signature moment, since this image schemata underlies all 
conventional narrative structure. While these two schémas may have shaped his 
"Stella!" for most of the audience, other image schematas no doubt came into 
play for spectators watching Brando-Stanley throughout the course of the drama, 
including "force" and "attraction." Clearly, a range of schematas, plus their 
attendant metaphors, would shape the audience's overall understanding of 
Streetcar, If many schémas are operative in a spectator's perception of a play, 
how many more must there be in a person's diverse experience of her or his 
culture! Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson assume that all of their primary schémas 
have given substantial shape to all of the world's cultures.6 
In these circumstances, the best a critical historian can do is to determine, 
hermeneutically, which of the major schematas exerted a dominant influence in 
the culture of particular social groups and how these dominant schémas may have 
been aligned with others to create a nexus of behavior and belief that constituted 
the culture. Culture, in this rough definition of the term, would derive from 
different combinations of primary image schemata, along with their metaphorical 
extensions. Based in embodied knowledge, the discourse of a culture would have 
a concrete relationship to its kinesthetics. Lakoff and Johnson insist, morover, 
on linking a group's culture to the material conditions of its existence. Johnson 
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states that the human being "does not exist as an organism apart from its 
environment. . . . Our structured experience is an organism-environment 
interaction in which both poles are altered and transformed through an ongoing 
historical process" (207). While Lakoff and Johnson do not probe the historical 
nature of this "structured experience," their general approach is close to Fox-
Genovese's method, an analysis of the interaction of historical agencies and 
structures.7 
A complete analysis of The Method in the context of the dominant culture 
of Cold War America is beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the image schema of containment operated near 
the center of that culture during the 1950s. Hence, The Method may be viewed 
as a kind of synecdoche of the culture of containment The culture of more 
marginalized groups, however—including white workers, African-Americans, and 
homosexual groups—seems not to have given such prominence to the 
containment schema. Interestingly, the analytical figuration center-and-margin, 
an image schemata itself, follows rather easily from the use of image schematas 
to organize an understanding of historical cultures. 
The popularity, even notariety, then, of The Method among the American 
"middle class" of the 1950s was probably no historical accident. Biographer of 
Strasberg Cindy Adams writes that "the Studio actor was the right person for the 
right time" (215). As critic Colette Brooks explains, in the 1950s 
the seeming ascendency of sincerity and instinct over training, together 
with the ensuing conflation of life and art, led to a comparatively new 
circumstance in American acting—the psychology (and personality) of 
the performer were conceived of as more compelling, on the whole, 
than the particular work he appeared in. (96) 
Brooks' insight suggests that many Americans shared the assumption of Strasberg 
and his actors that "sincerity" and instinctual drives constituted an inner core, a 
true self both vulnerable and constricted in its containment. 
The plays and films in which many Method actors appeared in the late 
1940s and '50s confirmed the reality of the contained self for American 
theatregoers. Theodore Hoffman joked that "the fundamental fault of The 
Method is that it always seems to be producing the same play, a play about the 
tragically frustrated desires of well-intentioned, deeply feeling failures, of 
Strindberg's characters living a Chekhovian life amid Ibsen's social problems" 
(36). Though exaggerated, it's an apt caricature of the protagonists in Death of 
a Salesman, A Streetcar Named Desire, A Member of the Wedding, and Picnic. 
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More Americans affirmed the authenticity of the contained self at the movie 
theatre. Critic Thomas Atkins writes: 
Method acting is the perfect style for the self-conscious and divided 
mood of the fifties. . . . Brando, Montgomery Clift, Julie Harris, Eli 
Wallach, Patricia Neal, Kim Hunter, Anthony Perkins, Rod Steiger and 
other Method performers are best in divided parts based on the 
unresolved tension between an outer social mask and an inner reality 
of frustration that usually has a sexual basis. (114) 
Herbert Blau's vision of popular theatre in the 1950s, which encompassed film 
culture as well, is darker but no less relevant: "[It] was a carapace in which one 
secreted his fear and trembling, muffled his indignation, and relieved outrage by 
innocuous subjective ejaculations" (88). Significantly, these critics rely 
fundamentally on metaphors of containment ranging from the inner dynamics of 
sexual frustration to the outer protective armor of insects. 
Container metaphors circulated in other arenas of social life during the 
1950s. Theatre historian Steve Vineberg discusses the popularity of 
existentialism, psychiatry, and the sociology of "the teenage problem"—all 
movements that positioned an inner, genuine self against the world—as trends 
that paralleled and legitimized Method acting. Through intimidation, blacklisting, 
and outright force, McCarthyism in the early '50s strove to empty the container 
of America of all political undesirables, creating a culture of introspection and 
suspicion that pervaded governmental, educational, and entertainment institutions. 
White Americans moved to the suburbs in record numbers, seeing in their ranch 
houses a container for their new anxieties about conformity and sexual roles. 
And in foreign affairs, George F. Kennan enunciated a figuration that would 
guide U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War, the doctrine of containment. 
All of this is not to say that audiences immediately thought of the threats 
of momism, conformity, and Communism when they watched Brando wail out 
his "Stella!" But they may have unknowingly categorized Brando's emotional 
explosion and the threatening flow of red ink into previously "free" areas of the 
global map as the same kinds of events, since Method acting and the policy of 
containment are linked through the body. The image schemata of containment 
together with several other dominant schémas and their extensions in metaphor 
seems to have bound these and other similitudes into a nexus of entailments that 
created a powerful centripetal force in American culture from the late 1940s into 
the 1960s. This social energy, on stage and off, may have channelled what 
Wilshire terms the "mimetic fusion" (16) of social interaction in a specific 
direction, a direction that probably induced many spectators to create and 
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maintain an historical "world" centered on containment. A thorough investigation 
might show that Brando's Misunderstood Male was right at home in the period 
that gave American culture bomb shelters and "closeted" homosexuals.8 
Notes 
1. In this regard, Frank Lentricchia, in the same volume of essays, remarks that new historicism 
is constituted by the "unlikely marriage of Marx and Foucault, with Foucault as dominant partner" 
(235). 
2. To spotlight Brando as an exmplar of Strasberg's Method, as I do throughout this essay, is 
not without its ironies. Although Brando did study with Kazan and Lewis at the Studio, Stella Adler, 
one of Strasberg's major antagonists in the battles among former Group Theatre actors in the late 
1940s and '50s, was Brando's primary mentor. On the other hand, all of the former Group actors 
shared a general orientation toward the teaching of acting, despite their disagreements. And in the 
minds of most Americans, Brando—especially Brando as Stanley Kowalski—came to personify 
"Method acting." My choice of Brando has more to do with his cultural persona than with his actual 
training. 
3. Disdaining the lure of polyphony, Jean Alter asks semioticians "to find an organizing 
mechanism" among the various sign systems of the theatre that "makes sense of their totality" (93). 
His own solution is to elevate referentiality above performance; for Alter, audiences would have used 
the character of Kowalski to organize their understanding of Brando's virtuosity. 
4. Connerton distinguishes between incorporating and inscribing activities, the latter defined 
as messages sent through the storing and retriving of information (eg., in a book). He wonders, 
however, if incorporation might underlie all forms of inscription: "It may be indeed that no type of 
inscription is at all conceivable without such an irreducible incorporating aspect" (76). 
5. Similar experiments included those by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay designed to test the 
categories used by people in various cultures to identify colors. Regardless of their language group, 
all participants identified the same hue of a color as the best example of that color category, 
demonstrating that color categories within cultures are not uniform; some members of the color 
category "blue," for example, are understood to be better examples than others. In cross-cultural 
research on plant and animal naming, Berlin and his associates empirically established that people in 
all cultures use psychologically basic categories midway between more specific and more general 
categories of naming. When asked to identify a certain tree, for instance, an English language speaker 
would almost always call it an "oak" or a "maple," rather than a "sugar maple" or a "deciduous tree." 
6. Although they have isolated what they believe to be the most pervasive image schémas in 
human experience, Lakoff and Johnson have not attempted to enumerate all of them. After noting 
twenty-seven schémas, Johnson admits that this is only a "partial list" (126). 
7. This general approach accords with Louis Montrose's merging of neo-Marxism and new 
historicism, in which structuring and subjectivity are mutually constitutive processes. See Montrose, 
"Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture," in The New Historicism. 
8. See David Sauran's book on "the politics of masculinity" during the 1950's. 
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New Format - - New Writers - - New Concerns 
Number 1,1993 
First English translation of Peter Handke's 
The Hour We Knew Nothing of Each Other. Essays on 
contemporary American theater by Elinor Fuchs, Marc 
Robinson, Alisa Solomon, Mac Wellman, Harold Bloom 
and Richard Gilman on Chekov. Mnouchkine's 
Les Atrides, the Oleanna debate, and more. 
Number 2,1993 
Special section on Gay and Lesbian theater, Richard Elovic, 
Holly Hughes, Gordon Rogoff, John Clum, Peggy Phelan, 
David Olivenbaum. Also: Robbie McCauley, Bergman's 
Peer Gynt, Gabrielle Cody, Eric Ehn, and a new play by 
Maria Irene Fornes. 
. . . and coming in 1994: 
o Nationalism, Identity Politics, and the World Stage 
o Brecht our Contemporary 
o Philosophy and Theater 
o Playwrights Directing Themselves 
o The Greeks 
• New scripts, interviews, reports from abroad, and reviews. • 
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